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Views of the 1980s and 1990s
In 1991, the American Journal of Occupational Therapy
published a special issue on clinical reasoning. Many of the
articles discussed the findings of the Clinical Reasoning
Study sponsored by the American Occupational Therapy
Association (AOTA) and the American Occupational
Therapy Foundation (AOTF) (Fleming 1991a, 1991b,
Mattingly 1991).
The AOTA/AOTF study used an ethnographic and action
research approach: interviewing, observing and videoing 17
occupational therapists over a 2-year period. It was the first
major study to explore the reasoning strategies used by
occupational therapists in their clinical work. The
researchers identified reasoning ‘tracks’ or styles and linked
these to reasoning strategies. The researchers had
incorporated the work of Schön (1983), which placed value
on reflection as a means of making implicit or tacit
reasoning explicit (Mattingly and Fleming 1994). The
findings of the 1991 papers have greatly influenced
clinical reasoning studies in the field of occupational
therapy.
Reasoning tracks or styles
The researchers in the AOTA/AOTF study argued that the
specific style of occupational therapists’ reasoning was
dependent on the content of the task being thought about
(Mattingly and Fleming 1994). For example, if a clinician
thought about identifying an occupational dysfunction, a
style named ‘procedural reasoning’ would be used (Fleming
1991b). Thought relating to a client’s perspective of his or
her needs would use ‘interactive reasoning’ and thought
relating to a client’s context and future potential would be
termed ‘conditional reasoning’ (Fleming 1991b). The
findings also identified other reasoning terminologies, such
as ‘narrative reasoning’ (Mattingly 1991). Subsequent
research on tracks of reasoning in occupational therapy has
therefore recognised statements by task content (Ryan 1990,
Alnervik and Svidén 1996, Fortune and Ryan 1996, Fossey
1996, Munroe 1996). This has sometimes appeared a little
forced; for example, questions relating to future prognosis
have been purposely asked to elicit ‘conditional’ reasoning
(Ryan 1990, Alnervik and Svidén 1996).
Reasoning strategies or processes
The AOTA/AOTF study also searched for evidence of
reasoning processes previously identified in the fields of
psychology and medicine. Hypothetico-deductive strategies,
whereby sets of hypotheses are generated and tested
(Schmidt et al 1990), were thought to be used primarily in
procedural reasoning and intuitive strategies were thought
to be used primarily in interactive reasoning (Fleming
1991b).
Mattingly and Fleming may not have meant their
findings, linking content with process, to be understood in
such a purist light. Indeed, in their book published in 1994
(Mattingly and Fleming 1994), they were able to give greater
depth to the understanding of the nature of the reasoning
strategies used. However, the pervading links seem to have
been grasped firmly and applied in occupational therapy
research. As a result of this, many researchers have classified
occupational therapists’ clinical reasoning either by the style
describing the thought content (for example, procedural) or
by the reasoning strategies recognised in the thought
processing (for example, hypothetico-deductive) (Ryan
1990, Alnervik and Svidén 1996, Hagedorn 1996, Munroe
1996).
To date, the ethnographic and information-processing
approaches have provided the majority of methodologies
used to study occupational therapists’ clinical reasoning.
Although these approaches were chosen to try to give a
holistic understanding of thinking in context, they appear to
be limited in terms of their ability to represent the holism of
the thinking itself. This relates specifically to their limited
ability to access reliably experts’ well-practised thinking.
These limitations are illustrated using the ethnographic
study of Munroe (1996) and the information-processing
study of Harries (1996) as examples.
This is the first of two papers that examine clinical reasoning research in
occupational therapy. It discusses the reasoning studies of the 1980s and 1990s,
focusing on ethnographic and process-tracing approaches. From this critique, a
need for an approach that acknowledges the experienced thinker’s intuitive
reasoning is identified. The second paper will present such an approach, based
on social judgement theory, and demonstrate the first application of such a
method in the field of occupational therapy.
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Ethnographic study
Munroe (1996) carried out an ethnographic qualitative study
with 29 Scottish occupational therapists based in social work
departments. The participants were field observed (by the
researcher as a non-participant) during 83 home visits to see
clients and carers. Field notes were kept by the researcher
and given to the participants in order for key reflection
points to be highlighted. The key reflection points were
defined as times when they were aware of their thinking.
The points were then the focus of in-depth interviews.
Three parties checked the analysis of the interviews: focus
groups of non-participants, the participants and selected
externals. It was specifically the times of conscious thought
that the researcher focused on in her data collection and
analysis.
Munroe (1996) stated that she had expected to find
greater evidence, in the field notes, of procedural reasoning;
for example, the routine giving of equipment would be
expected to follow the procedural reasoning track. However,
there was minimal evidence of this. What was perhaps not
considered was the fact that the repetitive nature of routine
thinking tasks can cause thinking processes to become
largely unconscious and intuitive (Abernathy and Hamm
1994). Therefore, once unconscious, the thinking would
not be accessible to the researcher or the participant using
this methodology. However, the authors suggest that it is
highly probable that procedural reasoning had indeed
occurred.
In the retrospective interviews, Munroe (1996) asked the
participant to reflect on the thinking that had occurred
during the home visits. She felt that, at this point, some
clinical reasoning occurred, but admitted that the reasoning
‘came later – often much later – and usually in response to
requests for interpretation or explanation of the thinking
processes’ (p200).
It could be said that it is difficult to assure the reliability
of the retrospective content of reasoning. First, if earlier
thinking has not initially been fully conscious, how then can
awareness be regained at a later date? Second, the poor
reliability of retrospective methodologies would be
compounded by some inevitable difficulty in recall. Munroe
(1996) did acknowledge concerns in using self-reflection as
an accurate tool for accessing reasoning (Dreyfus and
Dreyfus 1980).
Information-processing study
In 1996, a study of community mental health occupational
therapists’ reasoning was conducted to examine the factors
influencing their acceptance of referrals (Harries 1996). The
design was also drawn from the qualitative paradigm but,
instead of using the AOTA/AOTF classifications and
analysis, used methodologies from the information-
processing approach.
Clinicians were asked to ‘think aloud’ as they read real
referral letters. These think-alouds were followed
immediately by an in-depth interview. It was found that the
factors mentioned in the think-alouds were sometimes not
acknowledged in the interviews. For example, when reading
a referral a participant might have reflected on the
worthiness of the referrer making the referral and yet, when
interviewed, stated that he or she would view all referrers on
an equal basis. There appeared to be a mismatch between
the explicit reasoning processes in the think-alouds and
those in the in-depth interviews. Researchers suggest that
more weight should be placed on the findings of think-
alouds than on those of interviews (Elstein et al 1990).
Although this may be based on some post hoc
rationalisation, the think-alouds are thought to have more
validity than interviews because they are concurrent rather
than retrospective and, therefore, reduce issues such as
accuracy of recall.
The findings drawn from vocalised think-aloud data
showed several points of interest. The participants had their
own personal method of framing the data. This was seen
through the way in which they always attended to two or three
particular factors, regardless of the referral information. In
addition, the referral information influenced which other
factors were attended to. For example, the second referral
letter mentioned alcohol abuse, which led some of the
participants to consider the appropriateness of the referral
to their team’s service. Compliance with team criteria
overrode such issues as the needs stated in the reason
for the referral.
Although the think-aloud accessed some points of
interest, the think-aloud methodology did appear to have
some weaknesses. First, the think-aloud did not access all
the thinking that had occurred. For example, the participant
would read the client’s diagnosis but make no further
comment; however, in the interview there would be lengthy
explanation as to the necessary relevance of the client’s
diagnosis. This disparity may again be explained by the
recognition that the experienced clinician uses minimal
processing to make sense of familiar information (Abernathy
and Hamm 1994).
Another weakness of the think-aloud related to the
researcher’s difficulty in understanding which vocalised
thoughts were relevant to the decision task under study and
which were not. For example, it was only through the
interview that it became apparent that some thoughts had
related to the decision to accept or reject the case (the
decision under study) and others had related to issues such
as treatment planning. It was not surprising that the
decision to accept the case would be intertwined with other
thinking tasks: other researchers have found that
experienced clinicians do not use each stage of the
occupational therapy process in a linear pattern (one stage
following another) but, rather, use it in a much more
complex way (Hagedorn 1996, Roberts 1996b). Had the
think-aloud been used without the interview, the purpose of
the reasoning would not have become apparent. The think-
aloud is a common method for examining reasoning, but in
this instance it lacked the ability to identify those factors
that were significant to the task (Newell and Simon 1972).
These points illustrate that in this study some of the
methodologies of information processing had difficulties in
accessing accurate findings.
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The cognitive continuum: a
framework for reasoning
The cognitive continuum theory (Hammond and Brehmer
1973) can be valuable in helping to understand the
difficulties in accessing the full range of the reasoning
processes. It describes a range of cognitive modes from
intuitive to analytic, with quasi-experimental processing as a
mid-point. This continuum is in contrast to the dichotomy
often created between processes that are implicit and
unconscious and those that are explicit and fully conscious.
In more intuitive reasoning, strategies such as pattern
recognition and heuristics (rules of thumb) are used. Cues
(information) are immediately linked to known patterns
(Larkin 1979). It is a largely unconscious, rapid and
automated process: it is ‘non-recoverable’ (Hammond and
Brehmer 1973).
Hypothetico-deductive reasoning is a slower, more
analytical method of thinking that is characterised by
conscious awareness. We use cues to generate possible
hypotheses and test these hypotheses with further cue use.
It is clear that the process used is influenced by the level
of expertise. When we are less practised in a cognitive task
we tend to use analytical processing, but when we are more
practised in a reasoning task, and the information is familiar,
we tend to use intuitive strategies (Hammond and Brehmer
1973, Benner 1984, Elstein et al 1990). In addition, the
cognitive continuum identifies the influence of task
characteristics on reasoning strategy. Task characteristics,
such as stability and availability of task information, have a
strong influence on the possible types of cognitive
processing (Shanteau 1992). It may well be that different
types of reasoning task, involving different content, also
have different task characteristics and are associated with
different types of cognitive mode.
Influence of expertise
Within the specific task of diagnosis formation, there are
differences between novices’ and experienced practitioners’
reasoning strategies (Elstein et al 1990). Researchers
(Schmidt et al 1990) have found that experts in familiar
situations do not usually display explicit hypothesis testing.
As experts have the advantage of previous experience, they
have developed a store of ‘scripts’ (Abernathy and Hamm
1994). If a client has a familiar problem, the expert can use
pattern matching to trigger the direct automatic retrieval of
an appropriate script. Therefore, he or she uses a rapid and
automatic form of processing which is recognised as
intuitive reasoning (Abernathy and Hamm 1994).
Roberts (1996a) and Robertson (1996) recognised the
influence of expertise on occupational therapists’ reasoning.
The AOTA/AOTF study had focused mainly on hypothetico-
deductive strategies in problem-identification tasks. Elstein
et al (1978) were the first to identify that hypothetico-
deductive reasoning was used in diagnosis formation in
medicine. It was therefore not surprising that occupational
therapists looked for hypothetico-deductive reasoning in
identifying (diagnosing) occupational dysfunctions (Fleming
1991a).
Roberts (1996b), however, demonstrated that this did not
show the full picture: reasoning would vary according to the
level of expertise and the nature of the task. In her research,
38 practitioners wrote down their thoughts immediately after
reading three referral letters. Although some of the reasoning
might have been lost before the participants began to write
down their thoughts, some interesting findings were made.
Some practitioners initially used rapid formulations of the
issues involved (pattern matchers/heuristic reasoners).
Others appeared to have less experience to draw on: they
searched for cues and reasoned using various hypotheses,
sometimes not reaching any specific formulation. The rapid
formulators did show evidence of hypothetico-deductive
reasoning when considering some aspects of the case. In
these instances, they may have been less familiar with the
information. This would concur with the view that reasoning
strategies result from the interaction between the experience
of the practitioner and the nature of the task.
Robertson (1996) found that occupational therapy
students lacked the ability to make the link between a
client’s problems and his or her treatment goals. She called
for a method to access clinicians’ intuitive thought, a
method that could make these implicit links accessible.
Methodological issues in
accessing intuitive thinking
The reason that early research into clinical reasoning has not
accurately accessed the full range of reasoning, from
intuitive to analytic, appears to be due to methodological
issues. Elstein et al (1978) used process-tracing approaches
to analyse the verbal protocols of clinicians as they thought
out loud. Roberts (1996a) also advocated a process-tracing
approach. In the AOTA/AOTF ethnographic study, intuitive
reasoning was at least nominally identified, but the method
by which it was elicited was described as ‘difficult to map’
(Fleming 1991b). No details of the ways in which the
mapping was attempted were stated.
The ethnographic and information-processing methods
rely heavily on the reasoner’s awareness of how information
is being used to make judgements. They are therefore
limited in their ability to access the more unconscious, rapid
and unrecoverable reasoning at the intuitive end of the
continuum (Ericsson and Simon 1980).
With regard to accessing the thinking of experts, verbal
reports are now recognised by some as inefficient and
misrepresentative of expertise (Hoffman 1987). Concurrent
verbalisations at best get to the content of working memory
or the information attended to (but not necessarily how it is
used) and retrospective verbalisations (sometimes while
viewing the scenario in a video recording) are prone to
forgetting and post hoc rationalisation (Ericsson and Simon
1980).
From this perspective, expert occupational therapists’
thinking has not been fully investigated. If we wish to
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are, the less able we are to tell what we know (Nisbett and
Wilson 1977, Hoffman 1987). The teaching of students may
have reflected textbook theories on prescribing, from which
the practitioners had originally learnt. In practice, their
learning may have developed mainly from discussions with
colleagues (Wyatt 1991). If the information spread is not
true to the experts’ practices then the learning is less
effective than it could be. It is important that we consider
methods that are able to tap into less verbalisable processing
and find out not just the pieces of information used but the
weighting and combination of these cues as used by
experienced clinicians. Judgement analysis can allow this to
be done.
Limitations of current methodologies
To summarise, the methodologies used so far to understand
occupational therapists’ clinical decision making are lacking
in several respects:
1. It is likely that experts’ thinking is largely automatic:
processing has become reduced to a minimum (Ericsson
and Simon 1980). Some factors are also used
unconsciously and are not made explicit during data
collection (Doherty and Kurz 1996). Concurrent verbal
reports are sometimes inappropriate for the clinical
setting, so retrospective reports are recorded after the
situation has occurred. This unfortunately allows for
some memory loss of significant factors, which therefore
leads to missing data.
2. Hypothesising about policy judgements used in clinical
decisions has been found to be an unreliable reflection of
the judgement policies in actual use (Nisbett and Wilson
1977, Evans et al 1995). Owing to the focus of
qualitative research, the data have usually been collected
from small numbers of subjects on a small number of
scenarios. The ability to generalise about an individual’s
decision making or indeed about the profession’s policies
on decision making has not been intended. Another
methodology is necessary to identify the wider picture.
One essential reason for establishing the policies of
clinical experts is to ensure that education is truly evidence
based. Lack of sufficient data on expert policy has limited
the potential for training occupational therapy novices. Case
scenarios have been used to help novices build up their own
theoretical experience of clinical examples (Abernathy and
Hamm 1995). However, as the case scenarios have been
developed from information-processing methodologies
(commonly using retrospective reports), the qualitative
information used for training may lack the reliability and
validity that the judgement analysis approach could yield.
Conclusion
Reliable and valid knowledge of how a profession’s experts
identify and use information is necessary to train students in
good decision making. It is important to consider alternative
methods of understanding clinical decisions to see if they
offer more useful or complementary approaches. Judgement
understand how experienced clinicians make decisions, we
must find ways of accessing their thinking effectively. More
specifically, we must find ways of understanding the
intuitive reasoning strategy. The decision analysis school of
thought is unsuitable for studying clinical reasoning because
it attempts to suggest how decisions should be made before
decisions take place. It is therefore not descriptive of clinical
decisions as they are actually made in practice (Hersey and
Baron 1987). From an examination of the literature relating
to the development of expertise in clinical reasoning and
from their own research into clinicians’ clinical reasoning
strategies, the authors advocate that occupational therapists
complement the ethnographic and information-processing
approaches with the judgement analysis approach.
Judgement analysis has been successfully applied to other
clinical fields but has yet to be used in occupational therapy.
The methodology of social judgement theory (Cooksey
1996), known as judgement analysis, is proposed as an
effective avenue for studying clinical reasoning in
occupational therapy.
A study using judgement analysis
A last study (Kirwan et al 1986), now to be discussed,
demonstrates that information-processing methods can be
inferior to those of the new approach, namely judgement
analysis. It also confirms the lack of awareness that
experienced practitioners have when trying to report
verbally the factors that influence their clinical decision
making.
The study, conducted by researchers at The Royal
London Hospital, examined 89 rheumatologists’ policies for
prescribing anti-inflammatory medication. As the
rheumatologists saw patients, they were asked to record five
cues (pieces of information), such as early morning stiffness,
as well as the medication that they then prescribed. This was
used to identify the prescribing policies that they actually
employed in practice. They were then asked to give an in-
depth interview to explain how they assessed patients. This
was to simulate teaching their stated policies to medical
students.
The policies that the rheumatologists used in practice
were compared with the policies that they thought they had
used (stated policies). The stated policies were found to be
poor predictors of actual policies used (R2=34%). The cue
information recorded in the clinics was then used to create a
set of 50 paper patients (including a replicate set of 20 to test
for test-retest reliability). The clinicians then tried prescribing
for the paper patients and the results were examined. The
requirement for individuals to make decisions on a large
number of relevant problems is a methodology of judgement
analysis. The judgements over real patients correlated well
with those over paper patients (R2=88%) but, again, on
paper patients the stated policies were poor predictors of
actual policies used (R2=39%).
One explanation for this is that, owing to the
unconscious processing that occurs at high levels of
expertise, clinicians are not able to describe their practice
policies accurately. It appears that the more experienced we
168 British Journal of Occupational Therapy April 2001 64(4)
analysis, the methodology of social judgement theory, will
be described in part two: ‘Studying clinical reasoning:
applying the methodology of judgement analysis’.
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